Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018 Read online

  Analysis of India’s ability to fight

  a 2-front war 2018

  Ravi Rikhye

  © Tiger Lily 2018

  Table of Contents

  1. Introduction 3

  2. The 2-front war: China’s aggressions – Depsang, Chumar, Doklam 18

  3. China pushes India 50

  4. The 2-front war problem 67

  5. The Rise of China and India’s deteriorating geopolitical balance 90

  6. Indian Army114

  7. Pakistan Army150

  8. China Army175

  9. Comparing the Armies214

  10. Navies251

  11. Air Forces279

  12. Roads and Rail303

  13. Cold Start328

  14. Is there no way to defeat Pakistan and China?354

  15. False prophets of ‘rational’ nuclear policy385

  16. Indo-US alliance & The Quadrilateral397

  17. Intelligence: its collection, analysis, misuses, and bad intelligence420

  18. The shape of the next war438

  About the author

  I’ve spent 58-years studying defense, either full-time or part-time depending on the job situation. My output has been small for all those years, perhaps 30 books including four novels, ten annuals, two co-authored, and five refused publication permissions by Government of India. The reason is I study mainly what I want, and mostly that doesn’t translate into a monograph or book. I dropped out of college in my senior year; since I planned to go back I did not get my first degree until 29-years later. Subsequently, I’ve acquired a second bachelor’s and am working on a seventh masters. After completing one doctoral thesis (not submitted as I have been unable to pay the fees), I began another in conjunction with study for a third. Degrees are simply pieces of paper saying the holder has completed prescribed work. They don’t prove one knows much. Studying continuously has a negative side: the more one learns, the more one finds how little one knows.

  My intention was to have this up on Kindle by March, in anticipation of the next round at Doklam. For readers' information, there will be no resumption of the Doklam crisis. China has built its road to Jampheri Ridge, which is where the trouble started in the first place. And China has moved in a combined arms brigade, plus reinforced its previously minimal fighter air presence. Meanwhile, GOI has been busy diplomatically and politically kow-towing to the Chinese. In my opinion, the next crisis will be at another point, perhaps Siachen side, and possibly not until 2019 or 2020. Until the Chinese embark on their next series of incursions, and they will, there will be a false calm.

  In some cases, figures such as the number of brigades or divisions in reserve may not match up. I could not get the MSS professionally edited; as a technical work it would have cost $8 or more a page. Plus, getting the pages professionally laid out for printing is $4 a page. A professionally designed cover is $300 minimum. Maps made by a military map maker: $300 each. I did not ask for a quote on making an index. All impossible sums of money. Why not have given the MSS to a proper publisher? First, they must understand what the subject is about. Things stall right there.

  1. Introduction

  1.1 A single question

  1.2 The Indian way of war: Kargil 1999

  1.3 A look back at 1962

  1.4 The defense of India: geostrategy

  1.5 Forces needed for 2-front war, 3 models

  1.1. A single question

  The analysis asks one question and has one answer: Can India fight a two-front war against China and Pakistan? The answer is it cannot. Because of the China-Pakistan alliance, we cannot fight even a one-front war: engaging in a war with either adversary runs the risk of weakening the other front, leaving it open to exploitation. The solution, fortunately, is straightforward: build a 2-front war capability. The next problem is equally straightforward: The Government of India is determined not to spend money on defense. Today spending is down to 1.56% of GDP, lower even than in 1962. And we know how that ended. It takes little imagination to foresee what would have happened if 1962 had become 2-front: Pakistan would have walked over Punjab, perhaps all the way to Delhi, and we would have lost Kashmir too. If we chose to defend Punjab, we would have lost the North East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal. If we tried to defend both fronts, we would have lost both.

  For a strong defensive posture, we need to spend the 3 – 3.5% of GDP we spent 1963-1990, both to modernize and to raise eight more divisions that is the minimum needed. To negotiate from strength, we need 4%+ and to recover our lost territories we need 6%.

  Theoretically, India can fight a 2-front war on land. It can defend its “Near Seas”: The Bay of Bengal, the East Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Munnar (waters between India and Sri Lanka), and the Andaman Sea. The Air Force continues deteriorating, it can fight a 1-front war but not two. There are, however, severe problems on the ground. This should not be the situation on the face of it. China can comfortably deploy 10 divisions, Pakistan has 25, including one it calls Force Command Northern Areas, and two it calls “Corps Reserve”. That is 35 versus India’s 38.

  The matter is, however, more complex than a simple division count. First, China has ended its policy of assigning formations permanently to a theatre for regional defense. Its entire ground force, including airborne troops under the air force and marine brigades under the navy, amount to 90 brigade groups that are being trained to fight in any theatre. Further, China still retains at least six divisions. We don’t know yet if they will remain as divisions; nonetheless, it is best to include the, giving China 108 brigades. Still further, China retains many reserve brigades. These, while unable to assume a first-line role, can provide defense in depth, follow-up forces, and cover secondary sectors. Next, because of the Government of India’s etched-in-stone policy that ever meter of ground must be held, we need more brigades to divisions to defend than Pakistan does. This is discussed in detail. For now, accept that India needs one more division for each of XV, XVI, IX, XI, and XII Corps, and three more for Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand. The Northeast is reasonably defended thanks to the four new divisions we raised. Should that not suffice for a 2-front defense, 46 divisions versus China-Pakistan’s 38? Yes – but defense, not for offensive war. Without an offensive capability, we can stabilize our fronts with 29 divisions against Pakistan and 14 against China, which will leave both free to attack again.

  This book argues that for a proper 2-front defensive capability, India immediately needs eight more divisions, two corps HQs, and 12 new brigades. The remaining twelve brigades will come from existing formations. Immediately does not mean spread over 10-years in the future. It means the authorization and funding must be made now, and the job completed in 3-years.

  To win decisive victories, we need 54 divisions, according my calculations. Even that will not suffice. We have a very big problem with self-confidence. We are terrified of China and of foreign intervention. To give the military the confidence it needs to recover Kashmir and deploy enough force to deter our adversaries requires 72-divisions. That in turn means 6% of GDP on defense, of which 2% will be solely for replacing obsolete equipment.

  How did we manage in the past? Realistically we faced only a 1-front situation, which meant we could shift Northern front divisions against Pakistan. Today China and Pakistan are close allies, and there cannot any more be a 1-front situation. In the 1965 and 1999 Wars, and in the 2001 mobilization crisis, we shifted troops from the China front to the Pakistan front. In 1971, we could shift seven divisions to East Pakistan and still retain an edge over Pakistan in the west, provide a defense of

  the China front, and gain a cru
shing superiority against East Pakistan, because there was no likelihood of a 2-front war. Today, the onset of winter does not rule out a war with China November-May; China can fight around the year. Cold itself was never an inhibiting factor for an army that fought in Korea. The problem was heavy snowfall blocking lines of communication. This is no longer the case because of vast improvements in road/rail infrastructure in Tibet. We can no longer count on transferring forces from the north to the west without weakening the north. The alarming reality is that if we are to (a) protect every sector, (b) meet the growing threat from a large Bangladesh Army and a neutral Bhutan and Nepal, and (c) maintain strategic reserves, we require an absolute minimum of 18 corps and 54 divisions. This will break down into 3 corps strategic reserves, 8 against Pakistan, and 7 against China. Today we have 14 corps and 38 divisions. For transparency, it needs noting that India has many extra brigades, but so does Pakistan, and that cancels out. Normally, a corps has three divisions, each of three brigades, plus a corps reserve brigade,

  satisfying the minimum military requirement of 1/9th of a force for reserves. Because of the political need to hold all ground, however, whereas Pakistan and China are prepared to give ground, both our enemies have a much larger number of divisions for the offense than

  we do. Wars are not won by defending, but by attacking. Pakistan has

  14 divisions as reserve because it holds its front with just ten divisions.

  Its strategy calls for giving up ground even in vital areas to concentrate forces for the attack. Of China’s ten divisions, none are needed for defense, China can give ground all along its front. It will use border regiments (to become brigades) to screen its front, and reserve brigades

  to give some depth, keeping almost all regulars for the offense. This is, of course, a generalization, but for a broad survey such as this one, we must stick with generalizations. Pakistan plus China have a net of ~20 divisions for the offensive. We have 11. (I, II, XVII, XXI Corps).

  India

  Pakistan

  China*

  China front

  11

  0

  2

  Indian Northern Command

  6

  3

  0

  Plains

  10

  8

  0

  Strike and corps reserves

  11

  14

  10

  Total

  38

  25

  12

  * China will defend with 6-8 border brigades, four regular brigades facing Arunachal, 2 brigades of regulars from Xinjiang which can arrive in a few days and give ground until it reinforces the theatre and begins its offensive. Please note as of March 2018, border units in Tibet/Xinjiang are still organized in regiments. The ratio of strike and reserve divisions will be India 11 to China/Pakistan 24. This is a formula for losing.

  As late as 2001, we could comfortably defend ourselves against Pakistan, and maintain a good defense against China. What happened is that the world moved on and left us gazing tranquilly at our navels in blissful contentment.

  The biggest setback has been the rise of China to Great Power status by 2020, its drive for superpower status by 2050, and leading status by 2070. This has entailed a successful Chinese policy to contain India within its borders. We used to dream of being the leading regional power, and even once of being one of the four “natural” Great Powers (Pannicker). The opportunity has gone. The second setback is the tight alliance between Pakistan and China as opposed to the distant, cautious stance China maintained earlier. Pakistan is China’s most important partner in penning us. Third is our decision to reverse our no-alliance policy with the US, to accept an alliance – just as the US began its decline. The fourth has been growing internal security threat and a dysfunctional polity. The last is a most complicated factor. We lack a consensus on national security. We agree a defensive capability is required, but don’t agree that for defense, it must be paired with offense.

  For defense and limited offense, we need 54 divisions. To win solid victories, we need the 72-division force. To be clear: we don’t need 72-divisions to win. But what we lack most is psychological confidence. The 72-force assures us we can win regardless of the setbacks that seem to accompany any war. With the larger force, we will have the confidence to regain West, North, and East Kashmir

  This requires 6% of GDP, of which half goes to payroll, operations and maintenance, and half goes to equipment. On 2018 GDP of $3-trillion, this means $90-billion for equipment, and $90-billion for O and M. That might seem excessive, but much of it is to make up for 28-years of neglect.

  1.2 The Indian way of war: Kargil 1999, two anecdotes

  At some point in the 1999 War, the Prime Minister asked the Chief of Army Staff if it was feasible to retake Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The COAS’s response? “I have 34 divisions, even if I had 68, I could not do that.” It needs making clear the COAS was a thinking general, well-educated, and steady. And, of course, he employed hyperbole to make his case. Since Pakistan had 20 divisions, the COAS very much could have taken POK with what he had, regardless of the China threat. Notice he did not say “I will require 45-60 days, and my army lacks the ammunition, spares, and replacements to sustain a full-scale war for that period.” Readers will say “but we sustained a 74-day war”. True, but only for two divisions. Nor did the COAS say “Will you accept the 100,000 casualties that will result?”. Perhaps he brought up the China threat, which he should have known was not militarily relevant. Perhaps he was concerned about western intervention. There was no one to tell him neither situation could arise. He has the Army to run, he can hardly also be expert in foreign policy.

  The Facebook post below tells you more about the state of Indian defense that the 183,000 words in this book. Words in parenthesis represent my clarifications; I have edited the post for greater clarity.

  Bofors 155mm gun was low on spares, their prime movers were off road and ammunition was grossly short thus imported overnight at exorbitant prices. No one questioned the whole issue as it was for the defense of the country. The politicians knew if something drastic happens, this country will not spare them. The ammo was bought at “onay-paunay daam” (minimum amount) to save their skins. When Service Chiefs highlight such issues, no one pays heed but when politicians’ (fore)skin is stuck in the zipper then things move.[1]

  The shortage of Bofors ammunition was taken up at the MoD level during the Kargil war. No country was willing to give ammunition at such short notice. One country agreed but charged an exorbitant price. War had already broken out on those icy heights and ammunition was running out. Casualties were pouring in. Ammunition had to be shipped to Bombay and thereafter moved up north by train and then by road to Kargil. Ship would take two days

  to load, 4-5 days to travel (this suggests Singapore or Malaysia as the origin) and two days to unload. Bombay refused to handle ammunition as all other cargo operations would have to be stopped for safety reasons. The ship came and waited for two days outside Bombay. Unloading was not on the national priority, so the destination was changed to Vishakapatnam (a major port on the Indian East coast) adding another 6-7 days for movement. Railways had to re-position their (freight wagon) rakes. Due to ammunition movement and safety reasons, speed of trains had to be restricted. A 48-hour journey became 96-hours+, then more time spent for unloading and reloading at Jammu. Finally, movement to Kargil by trucks and then to gun positions required another 3-4 days. Kargil was over by then. (The war lasted 74-days.)

  Today, very approximately, 8th Division (HQ Nimu, on the road to Leh) with three brigades is deployed east of the Zoji La; to the west is a brigade under 28th Division, which originally held 8th Division’s line. 102nd (I) Brigade is at Thoise for the Siachen (NW of Thoise], and a new brigade at Daulet Beg Oldi.

  Kargil 1999

  1.3 A look back at 1962

  The military equation of 1962 can be stated in one line. India had ten divisions; Pakista
n had seven: 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 (East Pakistan), and 15, while China deployed eight, with several more available. Further, in the leadup to war, we had a single understrength brigade in Ladakh, one in the Central Sector, one in Sikkim, and a division HQ with only one brigade in the eastern sector. Today we have 38, Pakistan has 25, and China can deploy 10 divisions, so 38 for us, 35 for China-Pakistan. Correspondingly, there has been a severe decline in our GDP advantage. In 1962, Pakistan’s GDP was $4.5-billion[2], India’s $41.6-billion, and China’s $47.2-billion. China plus Pakistan had a GDP advantage of 1.29. In 2018, the figures are China $13.2 trillion, India $2.7-trillion, Pakistan (estimated) $320-billion. [3] In ratio, India is today outmatched by 5 by our two major adversaries. You will see different figures in different sources for China and India, but as relative advantage is under discussion, the series used here is the same. A different one won’t change the relative advantage. The Government of India maintains a Zen-like calm in the face of this huge disparity, essentially because we are so paralyzed we cannot think.

  Now, my preference for military solutions to India’s national security problems is shown in 48-years of writing. There are, of course, other solutions. By giving up our claims to Kashmir and Chinese occupied Ladakh, in principle, we can have a settlement in an hour. That isn’t the end of it, because China will still require our acceptance of vassal status in China’s “Everything under the heavens” world order, and it will continue its close alliance with Pakistan both for economic and geopolitical reasons. Still, that is a matter of selling the settlement to our public. Any propaganda hack can do that in 500-words.